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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did

the Court of Appeals err

in affirming

the Summary

Judgment for American Self Storage in reforming rent-rate increases
in violation of the Rental Agreement notification requirements, as
to a required threshold, prior to becoming effective?
II.

Did

Judgment

the Court of Appeals err

in affirming

the Summary

for American Self Storage in not recognizing

rent-rate

decreases not subject to Rental Agreement notification requirements,
as to a required threshold, prior to becoming effective?
III.

Did

the Court of Appeals err

in affirming

the Summary

Judgment for American Self storage in not recognizing the Appellant's
rights

to peaceable

possession

of

the Respondent's

premises

in

violation of the Rental Agreement termination requirements?
IV.

Did

the Court of Appeals err

in affirming

the Summary

Judgment for American Self Storage in not recognizing the Appellant's
counterclaim rights against the Respondent for locking the rent-paid
storage unit doors for a period of time in excess of five (5) months?
V.
Judgment

Did
for

the Court of Appeals err
American

Self

Storage

in affirming
in

not

the Summary

determining

if

a

conflicting, unsigned and unfiled Deposition supplanted with the
Attorney's canned Affidavit, for the same witness, for the same day
at the same time, and notarized by himself, constitutes an act of
fraud, when relied upon and utilized to obtain a Summary Judgment?
VI.
stripped

Have
of

the Appellant, his spouse, and
their

household, personal

and

his children

been

business property

in

violation of their U.S. Constitutional Rights 4th, 5th, and 14th
Amendments?
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

-1-

Pursuant to Rule 43(2) (3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, the Petitioner here, Respondent below, asserts that the Utah
Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in this case in a way that
is in conflict with the established legal precedents of this Court,
and

has departed

so far

from

the accepted

and usual course of

judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's
supervision.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition

by the Utah Court of Appeals.
This action

involves various

Appellant/Petitioner

claims against

the Defendant-

brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent when the

rent-paid for storage unit facilities was increased, then decreased,
then increased, then decreased.

The Plaintiff-Respondent locked the

Defendant-Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors beginning May 1988
through September 10, 1988, in violation of the implied covenant—
to undisturbed access—and in violation of the Utah Forcible Detainer
Statute

Utah

Appellant
business

Code

78-36-2(1) causing

damages

to

the Defendant-

for trover and conversion of the Defendant-Appellant's
property.

The

Plaintiff-Respondent

denied

this when

accepting the cash rent for August and September 1988. Consequently,
the Defendant-Appellant

calculated

lost earnings from

historical

earnings records and presented a lien to the Respondent commencing
October 1988 through July 1989, which was recognized, received and
accented with the appropriate and timely monthly amortizations, for
the properly noticed rent.
action

for

unlawful

detainer

The Plaintiff-Respondent brought an
and

restitution

of

the

premises

commencing January 20, 1989. The Defendant-Appellant counterclaimed
-2-

for breach of contract centered on locking the Appellant's rent-paid
storage unit doors.
against

The Trial Court granted a Summary Judgment

the Defendant-Appellant

consideration

for

the

Plaintiff-Respondent,

without a trial and without any

Defendant-Appellant's
despite

a

previous

counterclaim.

warning,

executed

The
the

Summary Judgment against the Defendant-Appellant, maliciously selling
all of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his children's household,
personal, and business property, including the Exempt Property.

The

Defendant-Appellant disputed with the trial court and the PlaintiffRespondent as to real poverty, and accountability of property sold
during Oral Arguments for bonding for the appeal. Subsequent to Oral
Arguments, the Respondent's improperly noticed supplemental relief
motion—the

judicial

entrapment,

for

which

the

Appellant

was

unprepared, was granted—the immediate retaliatory implementation of
the supplemental relief proceedings—whereby the Defendant-Appellant
spent eight (8) days in the Utah County jail.

This was unlawful

incarceration under the color of the alleged contempt of court in
violation of his U.S. Constitutional Rights 5th and 14th Amendments-for not answering specific questions as requested by the PlaintiffRespondent, and

the

trial

court.

The

Defendant-Appellant

has

included the ensuing actions by the Plaintiff-Respondent and the
trial court in the appropriately filed Amended Docketing Statement
dated November 20, 1989.
The trial court (Honorable John Backlund) denied the Defendant's
Motion for Dismissal and granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, which included dismissal of the Defendant's Counterclaim
with prejudice (R at 48). The actual order reflecting this ruling
was entered by the trial court on June 15, 1989.

-3-

A copy is attached

hereto.
trial.

The trial court denied the Defendant's motions for a new
This ruling was entered by the trial court on July 20, 1989,

(R at 15). A copy is attached hereto.

The Defendant applied to the

Utah Court of Appeals for an Extraordinary Writ Case No. 890455-CA
on July 21, 1989, similar to White v. District Court of Utah County,
232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951), with the order denying the Extraordinary
Writ dated July 25, 1989. A copy is attached hereto.

The Defendant

applied to the Utah Court of Appeals for a directed verdict, a new
trial, and to amend Appellant's Counterclaim.
these

motions

Defendant

dated

applied

August

1,

The order denying

1989, is attached

to the Utah Court

hereto.

of Appeals with

Judgment Motion to reverse and remand for trial.

a

The

Summary

The order denying

this motion dated September 14, 1989, is attached hereto.

The Utah

Court of Appeals applied Rule 31 of the Utah Court of Appeals Rules
affirming the decisions of the trail court.

The order dated June 5,

1990, reflecting this decision is attached hereto.

The Defendant

applied to the Utah Court of Appeals with a Petition for Rehearing
filed June 15, 1990.

The order denying this petition dated July 2,

1990, is attached hereto.
B.

Statement of Facts

The Respondent has painted, where all can see, on the outside
of the storage unit walls facing Interstate 15 near the American
Fork, Utah 5th East exit the professed claim:
"Electronic Security.
Personal and Business.

R.V. and Boat spaces.
You Keep the Key.H

whereby the Respondent explicitly implies a covenant to any tenant
needing their facilities that the property is protected for both
personal and business stored in their facilities and the tenant has
undisturbed access, thus keeping the key.
-4-

The Appellant entered into a month-to-month Rental Agreement,
which was provided, and required by the Respondent, as a condition
of renting their facilities, on June 12, 1987, (R at 74) for storage
unit Nos. 143 and 144 at the agreed monthly rental rate of $55 per
month for both units.

A copy of the Rental Agreement is attached

hereto.
The Respondent

properly

notified

the rent-rate

to

increase

February 1, 1988, to $80 per month for both units.
The Respondent

properly

notified

the rent-rate

to decrease

beginning May 1, 1988 to $55 per month for both units (Exhibit 3 ) ,
(R at 70).
The Respondent accepted the appropriate amount of rent at $55
per month (Exhibit 3 and 4 ) , (R at 70) yet locked the Appellants
rent-paid storage unit doors beginning May 1988 through September 10,
1988 (R at 56 p.3 par. 14). The Respondent persisted in violation
of each (A) the implied covenant to undisturbed access, and (B) the
Utah Forcible Detainer Statute 78-36-2(1), despite the appropriate
Appellant written warnings, which were served on the Respondent
(Exhibits 4B,4C, and 4E) (R at 70), but to no avail.
The Respondent, finally properly noticed and increased the rent
to $94 per month for both units to begin October 1, 1988.

(Exhibit

6) (R at 70).
The Respondent failed and refused to recognize any damages for
trover and conversion, on September 10, 1988, when unlocking the
Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors.
The

Appellant

properly

calculated

a

lien

and

served

the

Respondent with the appropriate amortization for rent commencing
October 10, 1988, (Exhibit 8) (R at 70).

-5-

The Respondent properly noticed and decreased the rent-rate
retroactively for October 1988 and to commence from November 1, 1988
to be $40 per month for both units (Exhibit 7) (R at 70).
Despite a previous written warning (Exhibit 8 dated October 10,
1988) (R at 70), the Respondent locked the Appellant's properly
amortized rent-paid storage unit doors (R at 56 p.3 par, 23) for the
period of time November 10, 1988, through January 5, 1989.
The Appellant provided proper amortizations, of his lien from
October 1988 through July 1989 (Exhibits 8) (R at 70) (Exhibits 9)
(R at 49) and (Exhibit 10) (R at 23).
During the Appellant's published absence (R at 44 p. 2 par.5) the
Respondent broke into the Appellant's properly amortized rent-paid
storage unit doors rummaging and pilfering the Appellant's, his
spouse's and his children's property in violation of Utah Judicial
Code

Nos.

78-36-1

"Forcible

Entry",

and

78-36-2(2)

"Forcible

Detainer", 78-36-9 "Peaceable Possession", U.S. Constitution 4th and
14th Amendments (R at 42). The Appellant upon returning petitioned
the trial court for a Stay of Execution granted (R at 33) and
accountability, but it was not granted (R at 31) and (R at 32).
The Appellant served the Respondent with a Notice of Appeal, a
Property Bond, Utah Judicial Code No. 78-36-8.5. A copy is attached
hereto, to no avail.

Since the Respondent ignored and sold the

remaining unpilfered property July 25, 1989, at 12 noon.

Lucky I

moved to Utah and especially Utah County—the reported fraud capital
of the U.S.
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENTS: There exists several genuine issues
of material fact which should defeat the Respondent's Summary
Judgment.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE I
-6-

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN REFORMING RENT-RATE INCREASES IN VIOLATION
OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, AS TO A REQUIRED
THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE.
•'Owner may increase the Rent by notifying Occupant
in writing at least 15 days prior to the first day
of the month for which the Increased Rent is due.
Occupant shall pay the Increased Rent from the date
it becomes effective. An Occupant unwilling to pay
the Increased rent may terminate the Rental
Agreement as provided in Item III below."
In order for an increase in rent to be effective the first day
of the month it must be notified to the Occupant by the 15th day of
the month prior to becoming effective.

For example:

the rent

increase to be effective January 1, must be notified to the Occupant
in writing by December 15.

This must be so, for the Occupant to

follow the remaining portion of the said Rental Agreement i.e. "An
occupant unwilling to pay the Increased Rent may terminate the Rental
Agreement as provided in Item III below.M
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy
created by this Rental Agreement by delivering
written notice to the other party of its intention
to do so at least 15 days prior to the last day of
the Rental Month."
Consequently, the 15th day of each month constitutes decision day for
the

Occupant, given

Owner

periodic

properly

notified

rent-rate

increases whereby the Occupant would be required to move out by the
end of the month if given appropriate written notice to the Owner of
his intention to do so.
The beginning of any month the effective rent-rate is determined
by the proper notification requirement 15 days prior to that date,
or the existence of the legal rate.

For example:

notified on May 24 is not effective on June 1.

the rent increase

The required 15 days

prior to the 1st day of the month notification requirement threshold
has not been met.

Neither is the rent increase notified on May 24
-7-

effective on July 1.

Since the rent for June is the same effective

legal rent-rate prior to May 24th, which pivots on the 15th day of
each month prior to becoming effective, in order for the occupant to
make appropriate decisions as to occupancy termination.
In the case at bar, the Utah Appeals Court clearly erred in
affirming the requirement that the Appellant is to pay $80 per month
for the months of May, June, July, August and September 1988, (R at
56 p. 3 par. 14) resulting from the improperly notified rent-rate
increase (App-8) (R at 70).

Furthermore, the Utah Appeals Court

clearly erred in affirming the requirement that the Appellant is to
pay $94 per month for the months of October, November, December 1988,
and January, February, March, April, May, June, and July 1989.

(R

at 56 p. 5 par. 29), since the appropriate legal rental-rate that was
utilized and properly amortized (APP-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, and 27) which was made pursuant to the Respondent's appropriate
rent-rate

decrease

(APP-17)

that

increased since October 20, 1988,
par. 3 ) .

has

never

been

appropriately

(R at 50 par. 13) and (R at 46

The Utah Appeals Court's reliance upon the Respondent's

assertions

(R at 56 par. 14 and 29), were clearly

in err and a

violation of the contractual notification requirements.
A case in point states:
". . . a foundational rule is that if there is any
doubt or uncertainty in the language, it should be
strictly construed against the plaintiff landlord,
who furnished the lease and required the tenant to
sign."
Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Uta^ 1977); see
also

Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950).
ARGUMENT - ISSUE II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT RECOGNIZING RENT-RATE DECREASES NOT

SUBJECT TO RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS , AS TO A
REQUIRED THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE.
The

Rental

requirements,

as

Agreement
to

a

makes

required

effective, for rent-rate decreases.

no

specific

threshold,

prior

notification
to

becoming

Therefore, the appropriately

noticed decreased rent dated April 20, 1988, to be effective May 1,
1988, (App-4).

Clearly changed the rental rate to $55 per month to

be effective May 1, 1988.

The Appellant in a proper and timely

manner, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Rental Agreement,
(App-42) which states, II Rent:
"Occupant shall pay in legal currency to Owner at
the Owner's agent located at the site in advance,
on the first day of the monthf the Rent for that
month. Occupant agrees to pay a $7 late fee for
all payments not received within 10 days from the
first day of the subject month for which payment
is due.H
paid the Respondent's appropriately noticed decreased rent (App-4)
on May 6, 1988, which was recognized, received, and accepted, then
deposited in the bank on May 7, 1988, (App-4), by the duly authorized
agent—with apparent authority.
The

case at bar denied

the apparent

authority—Ms. Audrey

Hooper, (R at 65 p. 2 par 1, 2, and 3) which states: "Admits, but
affirmatively alleges that the said agents had no authority on their
own to reduce the rent."
A case in point states:
"It is a general principle of law of agency,
running through all contracts made by agents with
third parties, [the Appellant] that the principals
[the Respondent] are bound by the acts of their
agents [Ms* Audrey Hooper] which fall within the
apparent scope of the authority of the agents, and
that the principal will not be permitted to deny
the authority of their agents against innocent
third parties, who have dealt with those agents in
good faith."

-9-

Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 257 P. 679 (Utah 1927).
Furthermore/ since the Rental Agreement did not have specific
language as to rent-rate decreases as to notification requirements
prior to becoming effective there is no bar, or requirement of any
kind for the Appellant to pay anything other than the Respondent's
appropriately noticed amount of rent in a timely manner.
A case in point states:
". . . a foundational rule is that if there is any
doubt or uncertainty in the language, it should be
strictly construed against the plaintiff landlord,
who furnished the lease and required the tenant to
sign."
Bonneville on The Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Utah 1977); see
also Wolf v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950).
The non-cash payment of rent at the decreased rental-rate amount
dated October 20, 1988, (App-17) involves other issues presented for
review. However the reduction portion of the issue is uncontroverted
in any way (R at 50 par. 13) dated June 12, 1989, and (R at 46 par.
3)

dated

June

16,

1989,

with

the

same

arguments

as

above.

Furthermore, the monthly rental-rate of $40 per month (App-17) and
the monthly rental value of the asserted $94 per month (App-14A par.
8 and 9) must be differentiated since the rental value must pass
through

the

notification

required

threshold,

requirements

prior

the
to

establishing the monthly rental-rate.
October 20, 1988.

appropriate
becoming

contractual

effective,

thus

This did not happen since

Consequently, the effective legal rental rate is

$40 per month for both units. The Utah Appeals Court's reliance upon
the Respondent's assertions (R at 56 par. 14 and 29) were clearly in
err and a violation of the contractual notification requirements.
See Appellant's Reply Brief pages 1 through 7.
-10-

ARGUMENT - ISSUE III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO
PEACEABLE POSSESSION OF THE RESPONDENT'S PREMISES IN VIOLATION OF THE
RENTAL AGREEMENT TERMINATION REQUIREMENTS.
The Rental Agreement (App-42) which states:
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy
created by the Rental Agreement by delivering
written notice to the other party of its intention
to do so at least 15 days prior to the last day of
the Rental Month."
No place in the record of relevant facts is there a document by
either

the Respondent or the Appellant that meets this required

contractual termination notification requirement. Therefore, one has
to delve into payments and case law whereby the possession issue can
be resolved.
The case Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain, 560, P.2d
701, 702 (Utah 1977) states:
"Where, by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease
becomes [in default], the lessor is entitled to recover
possession. He waves that right by the acceptance of rent.
He cannot accept the rent, and at the same time claim a
[default] of the lease."
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the payments
(App-4 and 7) would resolve this issue of possession in favor of the
Appellant and deny the Respondent's asserted claim, (R at 56 p. 3
par. 14). Furthermore, in the same cited case it states:
"A landlord seeking enforcement of a [default] must
take care not to do anything which may be deemed
an acknowledgement of a continuation of the
tenancy. Any act done by a landlord knowing of a
cause for [default] by his tenant, affirming the
existence of the lease and recognizing the lessee
as his tenant, is a waiver of such [default]."
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the timely
monthly amortizations that were recognized, received and accepted by
the Respondent

(App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27)
-11-

despite the filed cause of action, (R at 74 and 71) dated January
20/ 1989/ renders this issue of possession again in favor of the
Appellant/ and denies the Respondent's asserted claim (R at 56 p. 3
par. 14 and 23) commingled with the issue of acceptance/ is the issue
of amortization/ since acceptance of cash may not be the same as
acceptance

of amortization.

So one ponders

the case Green

v.

Superior Ct. of City and Cty. of San Francisco/ 517 P.2d 1181 (Cal
1974).

[Please review the court's discussion on pages 1178 through

1182] where it states:
H

If the tenant can prove such a breach by the
landlord [implied covenant to undisturbed access]/
he may demonstrate that his nonpayment of rent was
justified and that no rent is in fact 'due and
owing1 to the landlord. Under such circumstances,
of course, the landlord would not be entitled to
possession of the premises•"
See also Jarvin v. First National Realty Corporation/ 428 F.2d 1082
(U.S. CA 1970).
M

. . . the landlord sued for possession for
nonpayment of rent.
Under contract principles,
however, the tenant's obligation to pay rent is
dependant upon the landlord's performance of his
obligation;
[implied covenant to undisturbed
access].H
The Respondent admits (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14 and 23) they locked the
Appellants

rent-paid

storage unit doors for nearly

five months,

depriving the Appellant access to his business property whereby he
could not earn any cash.
set-off

and

counterclaim

Therefore, the State of Utah has allowed
as

appropriate

remedies

for

unlawful

detainer action for possession/ White v. District Court/ 232 P. 2d 785
(Utah 1951).

The Appellant applied this case in (R at 29 p. 3) to

no avail/ further applied in Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 890455
to no avail.

Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court states in King v.

Firm# 285 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1955) that:
-12-

"Thus under some circumstances a tenant would be
required to pay the rent or lose his rights to the
property under the lease, although the landlord
owed him more money than the amount of the rent.
This possibly would not be so if it were undisputed
that there was presently due and owing from the
landlord to the tenant more money than the amount
due and owing by the tenant or the rent and the
tenant definitely claimed the right to offset one
claim against the other.H
The Appellant definitely claimed this right (R at 69) to no avail;
the Appellant definitely provided timely and appropriate monthly
amortizations (App- 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) to
no avail.
Summary

The Utah Appeals Court clearly erred in affirming the

Judgment

against

the Appellant on the premise that

the

Respondent was entitled to possession (R at 56 par. 12, 14, 16).
ARGUMENT - ISSUE IV
THE COURT OP APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIM
RIGHTS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT FOR LOCKING THE RENT-PAID STORAGE UNIT
DOORS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IN EXCESS OF FIVE (5) MONTHS.
There is no question that the Respondent-landlord locked the
Appellant-tenant rent-paid storage unit doors, for in excess of five
(5) months, (R at 56 par. 14 and 23).
The Respondent's claim for locking the rent-paid storage unit
doors sounds of fraud, discussed in ISSUE V of this Petition For
Certiorari. However, the Respondent's claims do not comport with law
and will not be discussed in this issue.
The foundation of renting any facility from a landlord is the
implied covenant that the tenant can come and go as he pleases,
having undisturbed access so long as the tenant does not damage the
property, create garbage, interfere with other tenants, and the rent
is paid on time.
In this case, the rent was paid on time (App-4 and 7 ) , but to
-13-

no avail, because the landlord did not abide by his own implied
covenant to undisturbed access discussed in the Appellant's Brief
pages 29 through 34.

Moreover, this is a violation of the Utah

Judicial Code 78-36-2(1),(APP-31A) which states:
"Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who
. . . (1) by force, or by menaces and threats of
violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession
of any real property, whether the same was acquired
peaceable or otherwise . . . "
The Respondent, is not immune or exempted in anyway from the
unlawful locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors,
discussed

in

the

Appellant's

Consequently,

the

Appellant

Reply
is

Brief

entitled

pages
to

an

11

and

12.

appropriate

counterclaim pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No.
13 (R at 69).
The Trial Court's Minute Entries dated June 15, 1989, (APP-45)
and July 20, 1989, (APP-46) denied the counterclaim right.

The Utah

Court of Appeals denied the counterclaim rights in each of four
occasions:
A.

Order denying Extraordinary Writ—Case No. 890455CA, dated July 25, 1989, despite a similar ruling
in White v. District Court of Utah County 232 P.2d
785 (Utah 1951).

B.

Order denying Motions, Case No. 890461-CA, dated
August 1, 1989.

C.

Order granting Summary Judgment affirmance for the
Respondent, Case No. 890461-CA, dated June 5, 1990.

D.

Order denying Appellant's Petition for Rehearing
Case No. 890461-CA, dated July 2, 1990.

This i> a violation of each of the following:
A.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13.

B.

U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment, equal protection
of the laws, and due process of the law.
H

Many

attempts

have

been
-14-

made

to

further

define

'due

process' but they all resolve into the thought that a party
shall have his day in court—that is each party shall have
the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to
establish his cause or his defense, after which comes
judgment upon the record thus made . . . Thus, the essential
requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded
his 'day in court'."
Celebrity Club Inc., v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 657 P.2d 1293,
1296, 1297 (Utah 1982) .
In short, the Appellant is entitled to the counterclaim rights,
which include a trial asserting damages for trover and conversion,
for both his business property earnings, and the amending of the
Appellant's Counterclaim Complaint for the property maliciously sold
by the Respondent—in violation of the Appellant's PROPERTY BOND
(APP-40, 40A), tendered and signed by the Respondent (App-1) July 21,
1989, prior to the fraudulent, malicious unlawful disposal of his,
his spouses, and his children's property July 25, 1989. This court
must grant the Appellant's counterclaim rights as a matter of law
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13 and the U.S.
Constitution 14th Amendment equal protection of the laws, and due
process of the law, and the Constitution of Utah, Art. I Section 11.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT DETERMINING IF A CONFLICTING UNSIGNED,
UNFILED, DEPOSITION SUPPLANTED WITH THE ATTORNEY'S CANNED AFFIDAVIT,
FOR THE SAME WITNESS, FOR THE SAME DAY, AT THE SAME TIME, AND
NOTARIZED BY HIMSELF, CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF FRAUD, WHEN RELIED UPON
AND UTILIZED TO OBTAIN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The facts of this issue can be reviewed from the record the
Respondent

(R at

56 par.

13.), the Appellant

(R at

55), the

Respondent declares (R at 53 on page 2 ) , and states that:
"Since the affidavit was prepared before the deposition by
Plaintiff's counsel, it is only natural that some minor
changes necessary to make it comport with the deposition
may have been omitted."
-15-

Now# please review the Appellant's objections (R at 54 para. 3) and
(R at 50 par. Nos. 4, 5, 14, 15, and 16) and the Respondent's
assertions filed with the trial court after the minute entry dated
June 15, 1989, (R at 46 page 2, par. 4 ) . The trial court's ignored
knowledge (R at 44 par. 7 ) , (R at 45 par. 4) and the trial court's
reliance upon the Respondent's assertion (R at 41 par. 4) and the
Utah Court of Appeals' ignorance of the Appellant's Reply Brief
Issues No. I and II that deserves more than the curt judicial whisk
conveyed in its Court Order dated June 5, 1990, and July 2, 1990.
There is
that

his

no question that the Respondent's legal council knew

previously

prepared

canned

Affidavit

was

false,

when

completing the scheduled Deposition on April 29, 1989. Nevertheless,
he escorted his patsy, duped-witness into another room with the door
ajar whereby he instructed his patsy, duped-witness
canned

Affidavit

(APP-5, 5A), just

moments

after

to sign the
attesting

to

controverting facts, in the scheduled Deposition, described in the
Appellant's Reply Brief pages 1 through 7.

The Attorney's intention

and his hope was that of obtaining a Summary Judgment for his client
by asserting reformation of the contract, to a previous rent-rate in
violation

of

the

contractual

notification

requirements,

the

Respondent's adamant claim of a mistake; thereby asserting DEFAULT
in attempting to justify the locking of the Appellant's rent-paid
storage unit doors.

And finally, in providing evidence that the

court would believe that there existed a DEFAULT so that he—the
Attorney—could get pai* by the Appellant for his services rendered,
instead of by his client.

Perhaps his client believed that it would

be cheaper to claim default, mistake and require the Appellant to pay
contract

reformation

and

moving

expenses,

-16-

rather

than

for

the

Respondent to pay moving expenses when retaliatorily expelling the
Appellant

from

the properly

rented

facilities

intimidation, and now wrongful eviction.

by

forcey

fraud,

This, in my opinion, is a

violation of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule Nos.
3.4.(b) (App-35) and 8.4.(c) (App-37), and the Utah Forcible Entry Forcible Detainer Statutes 78-36-1, 78-36-2.

(App 31, 31A). Many

an attorney has been disbarred for similar actions, and Mr. Lynn P.
Heward should be no exception.

Some relevant cases in point which

should apply to the case at bar are as follows:
"The use of evidence by an attorney on behalf of
his client, in a court proceeding, of an account
known by him to be fabricated, is a violation of
the attorney's oath of office and is grounds for
disbarment."
RE Ernest H. O'Brien, 14 ALR 859 (1921).
"Accordingly, disciplinary action will lie against
an attorney for inducing a witness to testify
falsely.H
7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law

S 43 Pages 97, 98, and 99.

Hence, the Affidavits of both Ms. Audrey Hooper, (APP-5, 5A) and
Mr. Steven J. Nelson (APP-14, 14A) add nothing to this case because
each reeks of conspiracy and fraud—all manipulated and controlled
by,

in my

opinion, their

crafty Attorney, Mr. Lynn P. Heward.

Furthermore, I believe that the conclusionary statements made by each
affiant in their Affidavits and notarized by their attorney, Mr. Lynn
P. Heward, would fit very well into the analysis of Affidavits that
would not be considered as evidence on a Summary Judgment Motion
under U.R.C.P. Rule 56(e).
(Utah

1983);

Union

Bank

See Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 859

v. Swenson, 707 P.2d

666

(Utah

Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d
1986).

Furthermore, see

1985);

485 (Utah

Rainford v. Rytting, 451 P.2d 770, 771
-17-

(Utah 1969).

I believe the above rule as stated in Rainford v.

Rytting should apply to Mr, Steven J. Nelson's assertions in his
Affidavit par. 4. (App-14, 14A). See also Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d
1172

(Utah

1983).

Applying

these case laws

to each of the

Respondent's Affidavits as a minimum renders them impotent, against
the Appellant, therefore, requiring reversal and remand for trial.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE VI
THE APPELLANT, HIS SPOUSE, AND HIS CHILDREN HAVE BEEN STRIPPED
OP THEIR HOUSEHOLD, PERSONAL, AND BUSINESS PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF
THEIR U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 4th, 5th, AND 14th AMENDMENTS.
The California Court recognizes minors are "persons" under the
United States Constitution, and it is hoped that this court will also
make that same recognition, set forth IN RE Scott K., 595 P.2d 108
(Cal. 1979), whereby children's property rights must be respected by
governments.
The unlawful seizing of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his
children's property during

the published absence violated each

persons U.S. Constitutional Rights 4th Amendment, since each was not
afforded "due process" guaranteed in the 5th and 14th Amendments.
Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 657 P.2d 1296,
1297, (Utah 1982).

Consequently, the property taken and disposed of

was done so without appropriate "due process of law", and the
Appellant, his spouse, and his children continually suffer.
CONCLUSION:

The judgment entered in favor of American Self

Storage should be reversed and a jugment should be entered in favor
of the Petitioner, or in the alternative, the matter should be
remanded to the trial court.
Dated this

fH**

day of ^fuju

-18-

, 1990.

Respectfully submitted
William L. Echols
Plaintiff, Pro-Se

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Petition For Certiorari was hand delivered to Lynn P.
Heward #1479, Attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East
5375 South #E, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, on this
of

vj aM

, 1990•

/J?^

The sum of three copies, as agreed.

William L. Echols

-19-

day

Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

A m e r i c a n Tor]' I n v e s t o r s d b a /
American S e l f

Storage
Plaintiff,
Dated

-vsWilliam L. Echols

MINUTE ENTRY
6-15-99

Case No.

893000015

John B a c k l u n d
Judge
Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant's
Motion to dismiss is denied. Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare
Order & Judgment•
V

ciRpcijr

COURT JUDGE

.

k

"'"•.V.

Mail copy to:
923 E 5375 S. #E SLC, UT 8*117

Lynn P . Heward

Attorney for Plaintiff
733 N. 8 0 0 W. O r o v o , UT 34 6 0 1
Attorney for Defendant

William L. Ecols
Mailed by

S.

Wright

- HS)

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
American Fork Investors
dba/American Self Storage
R U L I N G

Plaintiff
vs.

Civil No.

893000015

William E. Echols
Defendant
The Court having received and reviewed Defendant's motion
for New Trial, motion to stay proceeding to enforce judgment,
Defendant's motion to vacate summary judgment, defendant's motion
for temporary restraining order, and further, having duly considered plaintiff's Objection thereto;

and being fully advised in

the premises, now makes and enters the following:

RULING AND ORDER
The Court hereby denies each and all of the above referred
to motions of the defendant.

Defendant's (list motions) are

hereby ordered denied.

Date:

July 20, 1989

Ci/rcuit Court Judge

tAfifi-Ht*

FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

%JUL8 519*!G

OOOOO
^ r / C I ^ K of iht Court
Wlrti Couruf Appeals

William L. Echols,
Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT

v.
Case No. 890455-CA
Fourth Circuit Court, State of
Utah, Utah County, American
Fork Department,
Respondents.
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied.
Petitionor William L. Echols has an adequate and sufficient
remedy for any alleged error by way of an appeal and posting a
supercedeas bond. See R. Utah Ct. App. 3; Utah R. Civ. P.
62(d).
Furthermore, petitioner does not request any specific form
of relief, or show that he will suffer irreparable harm absent
such relief and the judgment creditor will not be prejudiced.
Petitioner has also failed to adequately inform this Court as
to the nature of the judgment entered by the trial court or its
ruling which petitioner challenges.
The petition is denied.
DATED this

2 5 — day of July, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Y)J(***S. P. fctorjL
Russell W. Bench, Judge

FILED
rj

Al'S r f 1389

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

American Fork Investors, a
California imited partnership,
dba American Self Storage,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

ORDER DENYING
MOTIONS
Case No. 890461-CA

v.
William L. Echols,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant's motions for "directed verdict," "new trial" and
to "amend appellant's counterclaim" are considered by this
court to be, in substance, a motion for summary reversal under
R. Utah Ct. App. 10.

Said motion is hereby denied and all

issues are reserved for plenary consideration of the appeal.

DATED this

/

^ day of August, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Norman H. Jaclraon, Judge

33
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
.:.oU

OOOoo
American Fork Investors, a
California limited partnership,
dba American Self Storage,

ORDER RE: BOND
Case No, 890461-CA

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
William L. Echols,
Defendant and Appellant.

The respective motions of appellant and respondent for
summary disposition of the appeal are each hereby denied.
The "Affidavit in Lieu of Bond" filed by appellant fails to
comply with R. Utah Ct. App. 6 and Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3
(1984).

Accordingly, appellant William L. Echols is hereby

ORDERED to file with the trial court clerk the proper cost bond
on appeal, as required by R. Utah Ct. App. 6, on or before
September 23, 1989.

Failure to file the bond on or before said

date will result in immediate dismissal of the appeal under R.
Utah Ct. App. 3(a).
Dated this 14th day of September, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

I

»

rfj^&
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO
American Fork Investors, a
California limited partnership,
dba American Self Storage,
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890461-CA
v.
William L. Echols,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson (on Rule 31
Hearing).
The summary judgment of the circuit court is hereby
^^^

affirmed.
DATED this

&

day of June, 1990.

ALL CONCUR:

^ 3 ^ ^ ^
JkfaTth M. B i l l i n g s ,

>amela T. Greenwood,

Ju

Judge

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

American Fork Investors, a
California limited partnership,
dba American Self Storage,

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 890461-CA

v.
William L. Echols,
Defendant and Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 20, 1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this 'Pit/FOR THE COURT

ife? £ 2 ^ ^ ^
Mary tf Noonan, Clerk

day of July, 1990.

Ai </,-«. /

/ 4 ^ /tf'
/ ,

far**

FILED
Certificate of Receipt
of the law office
y^n Court «IAPP^»

of Lynn P. Heward, 923 East 5375 South #E, Salt Lake City, Utah
84117, do hereby accept a true and exact copy of the Defendant's
Notice of Appeal stamp dated July 20, 1989, at 1:29 p.m.
In addition I take written notice pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 64F Valvar of bond or undertaking—"In no event, however, shall such action by the Court
relieve the party obtaining the same [American Self Storage] from
any liability which may be incurred in consequence of the action
taken by him, [them] for which he shall be and continue to be
liable to any other person [William L. Echols] or party as fully
and completely as if a bond or undertaking were in fact given.n
NAMELY:

the Auction to commence on July 25, 1989, at

12 noon.
Furthermore, I take written notice of the case, White v
District Court 232 P.2d 785> in which the Defendant was allowed a
set-off, Counterclaim pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule No. 13. However, in the Defendant's case this was
denied by the Fourth Circuit Court—American Pork Department—•
dated July 20, 1989*

Consequently, an Extraordinary Writ will be

filed with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 65B(b),
claiming the same relief granted in the cited case.
Received on this _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1989, at time of

.

(A/>f-l)

day of

.

LYNN P. HEWARD #1479
Attorney for Plaintiff
923 East 5375 South #E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Tel. 264-8040
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN PORK INVESTORS, a California
Limited Partnership, dba AMERICAN SELF
STORAGE,

AFFIDAVIT OF
AUDREY HOOPER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 893000015

WILLIAM L. ECHOLS,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
County of Salt Lake)
I, AUDREY HOOPER, being first duly sworn, depose and say
that:
1.

I am a resident of the State of New Mexico.

2.

I served as a manager of American Self Storage, 420

East 620 South, American Fork, Utah 84003 from about July, 1986,
to about the middle of July, 1988, while a resident of the State
of Utah.
3. While I served as manager, I made a habit of sending
out notices to remind the tenants of the rental amounts coming due
or overdue.
4. On or about the first of May, 1988, I sent such a
notice to Bill Echols. A copy of that notice is attached hereto.

C fipf-s*

2
5.

Unfortunately, I made a mistake in this particular

notice, putting down the monthly rent he had been paying up until
a few months before.
6.

Actually, there was no reduction in rent and never

had been, and Mr. Echols owed the full $40.00 per unit per month.
In fact, whenever there was change in rent, I always explained
that the rent was being changed.

I did not just send a notice

with the new rent on it.
7.

When I became aware of this mistake, and particularly

when Bill Echols claimed not to owe more than was stated in the
notice, I explained to him on several occasions that it was a
mistake, that there was no reduction in rent and never_harLbeen,
and that he owed the full $40.00 per unit per month.

On each of

these occasions, the explanation was made in writing, a copy of
one of which is attached hereto.

Also attached hereto is a typewritter

copy which contains the words which I wrote by hand in the said letter.

DATED this Jc^

day of *A$/k (

' 1***-

rlj\,..w

•£,„>

AUDREY HOOPER

/

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

<„

&

?°l

-

day of

J

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

LYNN P. HEWARD #1479
Attorney for Plaintiff
923 East 5375 South #E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Tel. 264-8040
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH
COUNTY OP UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN PORK INVESTORS, a California
Limited Partnership, dba AMERICAN SELP
STORAGE,

AFFIDAVIT OP
STEVEN J . NELSON

Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM L. ECHOLS,

Case No. 893000015
Defendant.

STATE OP UTAH

)
) SS.

County of Salt Lake)
I, STEVEN J. NELSON, being first duly sworn, depose and
say that:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

and the agent in Utah for the plaintiff.
2.

I am familiar with the procedures and actions of the

plaintiff's managers in American Fork.
3. The billing reminders such as the one copied on an
attachment herewith for May 1988 are given only as a courtesy.
The obligations of each occupant of the storage units are set
forth in the applicable Rental Agreement.
4.

On or about September 10, 1988, I agreed on behalf

of the plaintiff that it would waive all prior defaults provided

(fyf-tH)

2
that Echols either began paying the current properly increased
rent of $47 per unit, or moved his belongings out.
5.

No representative or agent of American ever physically

entered any of the subject units rented by Echols without his
permission.
6.

However American did follow the extrajudicial remedies

provided for contractually and by law when there is a default, and
denied Echols access to the storage units he was renting during
the period of November 10, 1988 through January 3, 1989.
7.

Defendant Echols now has access to the property in

his units so that he can remove the same, and has had such access
since before he was served with the Three Day Notice to Pay Rent
or Vacate and Notice to Quit on January 4, 1989 at 1:15 p.m.
^

8. The monthly rental and the rental value of the
two units occupied by Echols is and has been at least since the
first of the year $94 per month, or just over $3 per day.

^

9. In fact, in September 1988 when Echols was given
notice that his rent would be raised to $47 per month per unit
effective in October, that was the rate that had been charged to
new customers for some time already.

(fife-*1**)

3

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:

^

<>'->< ^.

/ ^ ^

(Aff~we)

AMERICAN
SELF STORAGE
420 EAST 620 SOUTH, AMERICAN FORK, UTAH
756-5388

RENTAL AGREEMENT
OCCUPANT'S NAME

Eok U

kill

HOME ADDRESS ^ T ? A\. $00

A

(FIRST)

(LAST)

10 *

_CITY

(INITIAL)

_jap%y<W

BUSINESS NAME & ADDRESS
-ZIP.DRIVER'S LICENSE < 0 4 / ) 4 v 7 . 7 3
HOME PHONE 22ZO£i2vVORK PHONE
TODAY'S DATE (-}?''*** OCCUPANCY TO START .
UNIT NO. jLiJ
W- tVL\
.FOR $
JMonth
f^ArzJt
^ 7 7 - 0*70 JT
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, CONTACT / W > £
TYPE OF GOODS STORED.

IU \*.U^..\c\
RENTS AND DEPOSITS
Amount
Rent(proration of current month)
r Rent(1st month)

\\ \ Security-Deposit
Miscellaneous
Total received

$

,
'I.CC

Owner, AMERICAN, is the owner of that certain property consisting of storage units at the location identified
above. In connection therewith, the Owner by this agreement does hereby let and rent to the Occupant the above
numbered storage unit(s) at the said location (hereinafter called "site") for the rental and the period of time above
indicated and upon the terms, conditions and covenants specified on the reverse side hereof, and as to which the
Occupant does hereby agree.
I HAVE READ AND DO UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT,
INCLUDING THE TERMS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF,
AND DO HEREBY ACCEPT THE SAME.
I ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE INSURANCE
ON THE CONTENTS OF THE STORAGE UNIT AS
SPECIFIED ON THE REVERSE HEREOF.
AMERICAN SELF-STORAGE

I. RENTAL OF UNIT: In consideration of all covenants and conditions contained In this Rentr» Agreement including and baaed upon the information of the front,
Owner hereby rents to Occupant storage unit as described specifically on the front oHhis agreement. It Is mutually understood by the parties that Owner la not in
the warehouse business, nor In the business of storing goods for hire and under no circumstances shall Owner be deemed to be bailee or other type of custodian.
Owner's employees have been forbidden from providing any services on behalf of Owner. Should employees of Owner provide services at Occupant's request, they
shall be deemed to be agents of Occupant.
it. RENT: Occupant ahall pay In legal currency to Owner at the office of Owner's agent located at the site in advanoe, on the first day of the month, the Rent for that
month. Occupant agrees to pay a $7.00 late fee for ail payments not received within 10 days from the first day of the subject month for whioh payment is due.
Owner may accept correctly drawn checks for payment of Rent. If a check is returned uncollected, payments represented by it shall be considered delinquent on
the date originally due and shall be subject to the $20.00 Returned Check Charge plus late charges. Owner jnay increase the Rent by notifying Occupant in writing
at least 15 days prior to the first day of the month for which the Increased Rent is due. Occupant shall paylhe increased Rent from the date it becomes effective.
An Occupant unwilling to pay the increased Rent may terminate the Rental Agreement as provided in item III below.
III. PERIOD OF OCCUPANCY: The Period of Occupancy created by this Rental Agreement shall begin as of the date of this Rental Agreement and shall continue
from month to month. Occupant or Owner mmy terminate the Occupancy created by this Rental Agreement by delivering written notice to the other party of its intention to do so at least 15 days prior to the last day of the Rental Month. Property left in the Storage Unit after the termination date, and/or any property left In the
Storage Unit at any time after rental payments are 30 days In arrears, will be deemed abandoned by Occupant. After said date Owner may remove any lock from the
Storage Unit and dispose of the contents thereof without notice or liability to the Occupant. Owner shall give notice of Intent to dispose of said property to any party with an interest in said property of whom the Owner has knowledge either through the Leinholder disclosure provision of this Rental Agreement or through
notice occasioned by a filed financing statement, as provided by law. Owner may also terminate this Rental Agreement by any other means provided by law.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR OCCUPANTS POSSESSIONS: Owner shall have no liability for damage or loss caused by heat, cold, theft, vandalism, fire, water, winds,
dust, rain, explosion, rodents, insects or any other cause whatsoever. Owner carries no insurance covering any loss of Occupant's possessions. Occupant agrees
to obtain and maintain a policy of fire and extended coverage insurance with theft, vandalism, and malicious mischief endorsements to the extent of 100% of the
replacment value of the property in the Storage Unit. To the extent Occupant does not maintain such insurance. Occupant agrees to "self insure" the property to
the extent of its Full Value. Owner shall not be liable to Occupant or Occupants invitees for personal injuries or damage to personal property caused by any act or
negligence of any person on the Site. Occupant hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Owner from any and ail claims for damages to property or personal injury and costs including attorney's fees arising from the Occupant's use of the premises. Owner shall not be deemed to either expressly or Impliedly provide any security protection to Occupant's property maintained at the Site. Any security devices which Owner may maintain at the Site are for Owner's convenience only. Owner may also terminate this Rental Agreement by any other means provided by law.
V. PERFORMANCE AND GOOD CARE DEPOSIT: Occupant has paid the Performance and Good Care Deposit referenced on the front of this agreement. The Performance and Good Care Deposit, without interest, shall be returned to Occupant within 30 days after the Termination of Occupancy if, but only If, payment of all
sums owing by Occupant are received by Owner, if the Storage Unit is surrendered by Occupant in a "broom clean" condition and damage free. Performance and
Good Care Deposits may be commingled with funds In Owner's general account. Owner may, at its option, deduct from the Performance and Good Care Deposit
any unpaid charges, damages or rent due without notice to Occupant. Should the total deduction exceed the amount of the Performance Deposit Occupant shall
pay Owner the amount of such excess.
0

VI. USE OF THE STORAGE UNIT: Occupant shall comply with all government laws, rules and regulations regarding use of the Storage Unit. Occupant shall not use
such Unit to store any flammable, combustible, explosive, corrosive, perishable, noxious or dangerous materials. Occupant shall not place any signs or markers
about the Unit. Occupant shall not use the Storage Unit for residential purposes. OCCUPANT WARRANTS THAT ALL ITEMS PLACED BY OCCUPANT IN THE
STORAGE UNIT SHALL BE OCCUPANT'S OWN PROPERTY, FREE OF ALL INTERESTS OR LIENS OF ANY LIENHOLDERS EXCEPT THOSE WHICH AS REQUIRED
BY LAW, OCCUPANT HAS DISCLOSED IN THIS RENTAL AGREEMENT OR.IN SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE OWNER. All personal property located In
the Storage Unit shall be subject to enforcement of the Owner's lien for rent, labor or other charges in relation to the personal property and for expenses necessary
for its preservation or reasonably incurred in its sale or other disposition, as provided by law. Occupant shall not place any personal property or material outside
his Storage Unit. Any personal property or material found outside any Storage Unit shall conclusively be presumed to be abandoned and may be disposed of by
Owner without any liability of Owner to Occupant. Occupant must keep Occupant's Storage Unit locked and provide his own lock and key. Occupant may place only one lock on Occupant's Storage Unit and hereby authorized Owner to remove any additional locks by cutting or sawing the same from the latching device for
such Storage Unit.
VII. DELIVERY OF NOTICE: Occupant's address shall be conclusively presumed to be the address provided by Occupant in this Rental AGreement unless Occupant provides Owner with a subsequent written notice of a change of address. All notices required or permitted by this Rental Agreement shall be presumed
delivered when either delivered in person or deposited with United States Postal service properly addressed with postage prepaid, except as otherwise provided by

law.
VIII. DEFAULT BY OCCUPANT: Time is of the essence in the performance of obligations created by this Rental Agreement. Failure of the Occupant to perform in a
timely manner any obligation or duty set forth in this Rental Agreement shall constitute Default and Owner may proceed to do any or ail of the following:
a. Terminate Occupant's right of possession of the Storage Unit by any lawful means.
b. Deny Occupant access to the personal property.
c. Provide written notice of the default and the Owner's claim to the Occupant, to any leinholder with an interest in the property of whom the Owner has knowledge,
either through disclosure provisions in this Rental Agreement or through notice occasioned by a validly filed financing statement of the Owner's claim, a brief and
general description of the personal property subject to the Owner's lien, notification of denial of access to the personal property, a demand for payment, and a
statement that, unless the claim is paid within the time stated, the personal property will be sold or otherwise disposed of, as provided by law.
d. Take appropriate action to enforce the Owner's lien rights as is provided by law. LIEN: UTAH LAW GRANTS TO THE OWNER OF A STORAGE FACILITY A LIEN
ON GOODS STORED. IT STATES THAT, "ALL ARTICLES STORED UNDER THE TERMS OF A RENTAL AGREEMENT, AND CHARGES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID
FOR A CONTINUOUS 30 DAYS PERIOD WILL BE SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF TO PAY CHARGES." (Utah Commercial Code 38-8-1.).
In addition to the overage amount represented by the Owner's lien, Occupant shall be obligated to Owner for all costs, charges, fees or expenses associated with
enforcement by Owner of its rights including without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, service of process fees, appraisal fees and any and all
other costs, as provided by law.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS: a. If any portion of this Rental Agreement for any reason is declared invalid, such decision shall not affect the validity of any remaining portion of the Rental Agreement.
b. All the provisions hereof shall apply to, bind and obligate the heirs, personal representatives, successors, assigns, agents and representatives of the parties
hereto.
c. The provisions of this Rental Agreement and the right of the parties hereto shall be construed In accordance with applicable law of the State of Utah, Including,
but not limited to provisions relating to Self-Service Storage Regulation, Utah Code Annotated 38-8-1 through 38-8-5.
d. No waiver by Owner, its agents, representatives or employees of any breach or default in the performance of any covenant, condition or term contained herein
shall constitute a waiver of any subsequent breach or default in the performance of the same or any other covenant, condition or term hereof.
e. No subletting of the Occupant's Storage Unit or any portion thereof or assignment of this Rental Agreement by Occupant is permitted.
f. The heading of the various provisions of this Rental Agreement have been included only for the convenience of the parties and are not to be used in ascertaing
the intentions of the parties.
g. This Rental Agreement is the complete and only agreement between the parties and supersedes any prior written or oral agreement. No amendment or alteration shall be binding unless made in writing and signed by both parties .
DISCLOSURE OF LIENHOLDERS
Item

Lienholder

Item
Lienholder
Occupant represents that he has read and understands the foregoing Rental Agreement, including the terms on the reverse side hereof and agrees to be bound by
all provisions therein. Occupant also represents that he has personal knowledge of ail information supplied by him and contained herein and that such information is true and complete. Occupant personally guarantees prompt payment of rents. Occupant has received a fully completed and signed copy of this Rental

"ZTM* ,?*(?*J.
Occupant's Signature
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